This paper analyzes the connection, established by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, between the appearance of "man" as an anthropological presupposition of scientific and philosophical discourses, and the construction of a transcendental dispositif of thought. In accordance with this presupposition, the notion of life is conceived by Foucault as a by-product of Kantian modernity and inscribed within a Heideggerian ontotheology. By stressing the vitalist alternatives to this paradigm, the essay questions the hegemony of Western transcendentalism and proposes a naturalistic reorientation of Foucault's intellectual project.
In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences, 1 Michel Foucault devotes a few dense chapters to an inspired, and sometimes obscure, description of the "anthropological 'quadrilateral'" (Foucault 1970, 342) . His target is the emergence within Western modernity of an unquestionable, and mostly invisible, set of conditions of possibility; an "archaeological mutation" that has dominated both empirical knowledge and theoretical speculation up to Nietzsche's laughter and announcement of the "end of man". 2 The anthropological quadrilateral coincides with what Foucault sees as the transcendental dispositif determining the regime of truth of Western modernity, and consists of four conditions: 3 1) the "analytic of finitude", as the preeminence of limits set within man's subjectivity and finite bodies and faculties; 2) the inscription of finitude in a "strange empirico-transcendental doublet", in which man is the incarnated subject to whom all knowledge must be referred; 3) the "unthought", as that Other, not-known, impersonal Outside, in which modern transcendental reflection is rooted; and 4) the "retreat and return of the origin" in a place that is already-given and therefore nonoriginal and non-foundational, in the always already begun background of the "quasi-transcendentals" of life, language and work. 4 1 Originally published in French with the title Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines (Foucault 1966 ).
2 "It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology" (Foucault 1970, 286 ).
The transcendental dispositif of Western modernity is presented in
The Order of Things from a phenomenological and mostly Heideggerian perspective. Foucault's "anthropological quadrilateral" follows literally Heidegger's description of the "Kantian ground-laying" and anthropological turn of Western metaphysics, almost paraphrasing Heidegger's arguments on finitude, the "breaking-open of the foundation" and the transcendental analytic of subjectivity (see Heidegger 1990 ). Although Foucault's programmatic objective is to disperse the exemplarity of the philosophical field, challenging the autonomy of Kant's three Critiques and locating transcendentalism outside philosophical discourse, I am convinced that in the empirical works of Ricardo, Cuvier and Bopp (Le Blanc 2010), the silent coherence of Foucault's "critical history of thought" depends on his overarching Heideggerian assumptions about the Kantian destiny of Western modernity.
According to Foucault, the anthropological quadrilateral occupies the space disclosed by the Kantian critique, which "marks the threshold of our modernity" (Foucault 1970, 242) . At the end of the eighteenth century the system of Classical representation -i.e. pre-critical rationality and its set of disciplines: general grammar, natural history, the analysis of wealth -was shaken by an "essential displacement, which toppled the whole of Western thought" (Foucault 1970, 238) . This "somewhat enigmatic event", the dawn of Kantian modernity, was accompanied by "the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the space of representation" (Foucault 1970, 242) and by the ruthless hegemony of a transcendental paradigm, obsessed with the problem of the origin, foundation and limits of representation. After this event, the transcendental field became the terrain where the origin retreats in the unthought, the source of man's finitude, the invisible double that enfolds all empirical evidence. Kantianism assigns to man a functional and relational status, and therefore reinvents humanity as an "empirico-transcendental doublet", an architectural joint, a place at the crossroad of both the transcendental field and the new empirical fields. Labour, life and language are the new "historical transcendentals" that, through their articulation by political economy, biology and philology, direct the development of Western rationality and socio-political organization:
Labour, life and language appear as so many 'transcendentals' which make possible the objective knowledge of living beings, of the laws of production, and of the forms of language. In their being they are outside knowledge, but by that very fact they are conditions of knowledge; they correspond to Kant's discovery of a transcendental field [...] they totalize phenomena and express the a priori coherence of empirical multiplicities (Foucault 1970, 244) .
Beyond the details of his analyses, the core of Foucault's argument is the connection between the appearance of man as an anthropological presupposition of all scientific and philosophical discourses, and the unfolding of a transcendental tradition of thought, which runs from Kant to Heidegger. The intersection of these two vectors (i.e. of Kant's epistemological subjectivism and the anthropological turn that characterizes the human sciences) produces a unified episteme, centered on man as an impure place of passage and relational device. Man and human subjectivity are at the same time the passive object and active subject of a mixed knowledge, which oscillates between the expressive borders of the Kantian age: ontology and positivism, promise and reduction, eschatology and empiricity. Transcendentalism for Foucault is therefore much more than a historically determined philosophical option, shared by Kant, the neo-Kantians, and Husserl's phenomenology. Rather, it is the common destiny of Western modernity, a dispositif which is displaced, transformed and yet continuously reaffirmed; 5 a self-referential apparatus that (thanks to a phantasmal duplication) depends on the empirical for its condition of possibility and truth: "For the threshold of our modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, but rather by the constitution of an empirical-transcendental doublet which was called man" (Foucault 1970, 319 (Foucault 1970, 341) . Having overcome the ordered space of representation of Classical discourse, Western modernity finds itself trapped in a Kantian fold, a transcendental illusionism centered on "anthropology as an analytic of man". Foucault reasserts this idea with a memorable sentence, in the same year that The Order of Things is published: "the Kantian enigma" has "stupefied Western thought, leaving it blind to its own modernity for nearly two hundred years" (Foucault 1994, 546 ).
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Becoming Nietzsche
In the last pages of the chapter of The Orders of Things, in which Foucault confronts a Kant-driven modernity absorbed into the aporias of "man and his doubles", the hegemony of the anthropological quadrilateral gives way to the figure of an "anthropological sleep". The Kantian critical awakening from dogmatic slumber becomes in Foucault a denunciation of the "anthropological configuration" of the modern episteme: "All empirical knowledge, provided it concerns man, can serve as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of all truth must be discoverable" (Foucault 1970, 341) . The pathos and care shown by the human sciences' attempt to define man as "a living being, an individual at work, or a speaking subject" is redirected by the "transcendental function" into a foundation of finitude. The "man of nature, of exchange, or discourse" is reduplicated into an analytic of limits and ontological structures. When Foucault declares that "Anthropology constitutes perhaps the fundamental arrangement that has governed and controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day" (Foucault 1970, 342) , his polemical objective is the incestuous cohabitation of the empirical and the critical, under the insignia of man's humanity and its human and social sciences. The transcendental dispositif consists in this relational function inserted in the human; a mechanism of correlation that -from Kant's schematism to Husserl's intentionality, from Heidegger's ontological difference to Deleuze's theory of individuation -has guaranteed the odd, flexible and polarized stability of Western empirico-critical humanity, the balance and coexistence of its positivism and mysticism, the hallucinatory naturality of its synthesis of prophetism and economic-political reductionism.
In keeping with his acknowledgment, and acceptance, of the thorny destiny of Kantian modernity, Foucault apocalyptically predicts it being overcome, arguing that "there is no other way than to destroy the anthropological 'quadrilateral' in its very foundations," and points to the "Nietzschean experience" as the "first attempt at this uprooting of Anthropology" (Foucault 1970, 341) . The Order of Things offers just a few scattered indications of what a non-Kantian episteme might look like, mentioning Nietzsche's "philological critique" and "certain form of biologism", his championing of the "enigmatic multiplicity" of language, and his concentration on the who of discourse, on "the possessor of the word" (Foucault 1970 ).
We know how, after the archaeological phase of The Order of Things, Foucault moves to a genealogical inquiry guided by a closer dialogue with Nietzsche. 
The Kantian Sleep: On the Limits of the "Foucault Effect" Federico Luisetti
Otras Voces gressively, Foucault's research turns into a redde rationem with Nietzsche, a "becoming Nietzsche" to such an extent that much of what we recognize as Foucauldian, especially in the so-called "late Foucault" -the contingency of the origins, the connection of pouvoir and savoir, the genealogy of Western "will to truth", the emergence and variation of specific techniques of power accompanied by forms of subjectification, the problematic of biopower and biopolitics, governmentality and parrhesia, the care of the self -can be seen primarily as polite declinations of Nietzsche's destruction of the political, ethical, and conceptual legacy of Western thought. Despite Foucault's own attempt to mark the inner lines of continuity of his thought, it is evident that his early sympathy for modes of epistemological structuralism still heavily indebted to the transcendental paradigm 9 is replaced by a growing Nietzschean hostility towards this Kantian vocabulary.
10 And yet, it is also well known that, up to his testamentary essay What is Enlightenment?, Foucault has never followed Nietzsche's radicalism in his merciless scorn for Kant, always refusing to cut the umbilical cord that connects him to Kant and the Enlightenment. The question of critique, the discourse on the limits of reason, and the heritage of modernity, have survived in Foucault alongside with his engagement with Nietzsche's anti-philosophical contempt for Western civilization.
11 "Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits.
[...] [I]t seems to me that a meaning can be attributed to that critical interrogation on the present and on ourselves which Kant formulated by reflecting on the Enlightenment. It seems to me that Kant's reflection is even a way of philosophizing that has not been without its importance or effectiveness during the last two centuries. The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" (Foucault 1984a What are the consequences of Foucault's unyielding positioning within Heidegger's history of Western metaphysics, within his ontological rewriting of Kant's transcendentalism and Nietzsche's nihilism, within his understanding of truth's mechanism of "concealedness" and "unconcealedness"? 14 In the remaining pages I will take for granted a certain "Heideggerian sleep" of Foucault, 15 concentrating exclusively on a crucial repercussion of this epoch-making Heideggerianism, to show how a new reading of Foucault, but also of the most adventurous European philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century, would benefit from its recognition.
A Life
What Foucault has inherited from his age -and mostly from French phenomenologically-oriented philosophical historiography, which has been under the spell of Heidegger's powerful reinvention of ontology -is a peculiar blindness, the impossibility to ascertain the radical alternative between transcendentalism (as the philosophical mainstream of modern Western philosophy) and vitalism (as the principal challenge to this Kantian reign). This attitude, quite typical of post-Second World War European intellectuals, translates into a weakening of Nietzsche's naturalism and a de facto refutation of Bergson's vitalism, and includes a defense of philosophy's cognitive autonomy against the anti-philosophical inclinations of Nietzsche and Bergson. While Foucault's influential teacher and mentor, George Canguilhem, eventually overcomes his own Kantianism to champion a biological reduction of philosophy and Bergsonian naturalism (Bianco 2012), Foucault limits his conversion to the theorization of bio-power, without however removing his anti-Bergsonian and anti-naturalistic bias. creative interpretations of Nietzsche and Bergson, 16 we find the manufacturing of a seductive and yet paradoxical neoKantian image for Kant's primary opponents, a conceptual engineering that restyles Nietzsche and Bergson into ontologists of difference and "transcendental vitalism". 17 With Deleuze, Foucault's empirico-transcendental doublet loses its anthropological traits and is replaced by an inhuman doublet, a "transcendental empiricism", the life of a "spiritual automaton" that presides over disjunctive syntheses and processes of individuation. 18 Beyond the theoretical minutiae of Foucault's and Deleuze's conceptual virtuosity, the "Kantian sleep" prolonged by Heideggerian ontology and radicalized to its furthermost limits by the philosophies of difference and exteriority, requires a double-bind relationship not only with Kant and transcendentalism, but also with the Enlightenment and the destiny of Western modernity; that is, the willingness to accept without reservation a common destiny and engrave it in the theoretical apparatus of the West.
We can see this strategic mouvement sur place at work inside Kantianism and European philosophical modernity, also in some of the most significative readings of Foucault. Let's take as an example Canguilhem's review of Michel Foucault's The Order of Things. Here Canguilhem inscribes Foucault's archaeology of the human sciences within the tasks of a "non-Kantian analytics", defined by the "obligations" of "non-Kantianism" (Canguilhem 2005, 92) . And yet, just a few paragraphs after this sentence, Canguilhem concludes his eulogy of Foucault's book with a Kantian prophecy: "Les Mots et les choses might play for a future Kant, as yet unknown as such, the awakening role that Kant attributed to Hume. In such a case we would have skipped a step in the non repetitive reproduction of epistemic history by saying of this work that it is to the sciences of man what the Critique of Pure Reason was to the sciences of nature" (Canguilhem 2005, 93 ).
In his monograph on Foucault, Deleuze is even more explicit, proposing a systematic interpretation of Foucault's work as a neo-Kantian reinvention of transcendentalism: 16 See Deleuze (1991and 1983 We already know how The Order of Things encounters life at the beginning of modernity, discovering its status as a historical a priori, as a new conceptual possibility arising within Western transcendentalism (Tarizzo 2010) . As a by-product of the empirical-transcendental machine, life (as Foucault understood it) possesses all the characteristics of the Kantian episteme: it is a "synthetic notion" that replaces the taxonomic space of the Classical age (Foucault 1970, 269) ; it is a non-natural phenomenon endowed with an "enigmatic" and obscure vitality (the puzzling life of the quasi-transcendentals); it is a historicized nature, a kenosis of the transcendental (Foucault 1970) ; it is a mysterious activity that penetrates the living, shaping it from within and yet preserving itself as a pure Outside, a source. 19 Like Deleuze's une vie, the "immanent life", the "pure life" of the transcendental field (Deleuze 2001 ), Foucault's life is a transcendental hallucination. And yet, while Deleuze stresses its vital and creative connotations, Foucault is fascinated by the nightmarish aspects of this disincarnated vitality, by the "disturbing and nocturnal powers" of its biological animality: "the animal appears as the bearer of that death to which it is, at the same time, subjected; it contains a perpetual devouring of life by life. It belongs to nature only at the price of containing within itself a nucleus of anti-nature" (Foucault 1970, 277-278) . 20 Foucault's account of life has surrendered to the deadly hug of transcendentalism. In The Order of Things, from the perspective of a unified Kantian episteme, Foucault overlaps transcendentalism and biologism, life as a relational dispositif and vitalism, so that his conception of vitality falls back into a neo-Kantian Weltanschauung. And yet, the naturality of nature did not exhaust itself with Kant and the end of the Classical age. It was carried over, profoundly renovated from within, by the vitalist anti-Kantianisms of Bergson and Nietzsche, by the avant-gardes' technological immanentism, by biophilosophical and Orientalist trends (Luisetti 2011 ). The anti-philosophical force of dispersion of Bergson's and Nietzsche's thought lies precisely in their non-belonging to the false dualism of Classical, representational naturalism, and modern, transcendental vitalism. The vitalist turn opposed by Nietzsche and Bergson to the transcendental unconscious of the European episteme is not a lost chapter of the history of European Kantianism. It undermines the desire to belong to the fate of Western modernity, exposing it to the multiplicity of its archaisms and geo-philosophical localisms. While the testamentary will of Foucault embraces the Kantian dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy,21 the vitalist destruction of transcendentalism unveils in the theoretical ethos of autonomy the disturbing afterlife of the West's lost centrality.
A Theologian Success
In the present conjuncture the secret paradigmatic force of transcendentalism and Heideggerianism has begun to fade, making the theoretical projects of Foucault, Deleuze and European post-phenomenological philosophy as a whole substantially indecipherable. The synthesis of Kant and Nietzsche, the convergence of Bergsonism and phenomenology, which was perceived as natural for the readers of Hyppolite and Heidegger, 20 We may notice how this transcendental epistemology of life resonates with Agamben's negative dialectic of "bare life"; see Agamben (1998) . 21 In What is Enlightenment? Foucault asserts the virtue of "critique" as "a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy" (Foucault 1984a, 44 of Vuillemin and Canguilhem, has now lost its obviousness. Transcendental vitalism is now an exotic coin, no longer a spontaneous philosophical attitude.
The positive effect of this redistribution of philosophical attitudes is the resurfacing of the structural incompatibility between transcendentalism and vitalism. Nietzsche's assault on Kant can now be reclaimed from the Heideggerian and neo-Heideggerian taming of vitalism, and restituted to its genetic conditions. First and foremost, Kantianism is in fact for Nietzsche a moral option, a continuation of Christianity and Romanticism, the recreation of "the moral instincts of Christianity". Kant translates and upholds in the scholastic realm Rousseau's "vindictive rancor", his "self-contempt and heated vanity" (Nietzsche 1994, 62) . A man of "moral fanaticism", Kant had no eye "for the actuality of his time, e.g., Revolution" and was "untouched by Greek philosophy" (Nietzsche 1994, 60).
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Since Kant has re-infused Christianity with a subtle "theologian blood", Nietzsche's violent assault on Kant's transcendentalism is a fundamental step in his campaign against European philosophical modernity: 
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If we accept the Nietzschean and Bergsonian refutation of Kantian modernity, we might be able to extract from Foucault's self-imposed alliance with criticism and European Enlightenment the seeds of a contemporary form of non-transcendental thought. Are there, in the "Foucault effect", any sparkles of an "affirmative biopolitics"? 24 What vitalist antidotes can we detect in Foucauldianism if we decide to counter the "subterranean Christianity" of Western philosophical modernity with an immanentistic reorientation?
The main vitalist assumption articulated by Foucault throughout his work concerns topology. As in Bergson, who grounds knowledge in action and contact, in a pragmatic of behavior and movements in life-spaces, the structuralist heritage is reframed by Foucault into a topological and formalist paradigm, where archives, diagrams, discursive formations and visibilities are distributed and altered, designing a space of stability and variation, of persistence and repetitions, of continuity and dispersion. The topological orientation of Foucault's method, the complex space-time compounds that it generates, have been noted and carefully reconstructed by Deleuze, for whom "Foucault's general principle is that every form is a compound of relations between forces [...] every inside-space is topologically in contact with the outside-space, independent of distance and on the limits of a 'living'" (Deleuze 1988, 124 Conversely, I would argue that we should concentrate instead on the naturalistic implications of Foucault's topological turn. If life processes are not polarized between finitude and its ontological Outside, torn by the virtuality of the transcendental field and folded along the lines of Kantian self-affection, then we shall abandon the new a priori of neoKantian reason -the Neuter, ontological Difference, the Outside, the Impersonal -and explore the immanent logic of action and thought-movements, the distributions and qualitative transformations of singularities, the intersections and differences of kind among vital forces, the qualities and effects of borders and obstacles, the creativity and paradoxes of a life which has finally learned how to accept its puzzling naturality (Lewin 1936) . Reversing Foucault's understanding of Kant, we might say that topological vitalism abandons the notion of man's autonomy and his ghostly Outsides, the transcendental hypostases in which humanity reflects its desires of permanence and its fears of dependence, seeking "mature adulthood" in the acknowledgment that "the essence of the living thing is that, insofar as it is living, it is immediately present to itself" (Canguilhem 1994, 318 ).
The principles of multiplicity and localization, of change and transformation, of exteriority and rarity must be untangled from the traces of neo-Kantianism and Heideggerianism, and fully restored to their vitalist force. 26 What happens for instance when we apply the criterion of localization to the very conditions of production, relevance and diffusion of European thought? What is the destiny of the residual forms of Western universalism, of the negative ontologies of otherness and the During a conversation with Buddhist priests, recorded in a Japanese Zen temple in 1978, Foucault offered an instance of this approach, addressing the underlying geophilosophical localization of his intellectual project: "Europe finds itself in a defined region of the world and in a defined period. That said, it presents the specificity of creating a universal category which categorises the modern world. Europe is the birth place of universality. In this sense, the crisis of European thought concerns the whole world. It is a crisis which influences different thoughts in all the countries of the world, as well as the general thought of the world [...] the crisis of Western thought, the crisis of the Western concept which is revolution, the crisis of the Western concept which is man and society. It is a crisis which concerns the entire world" (Foucault 1999, 113) .
While most philosophical positions, at least in Europe and North America, programmatically deny the crisis of Western universalism, Foucault territorializes the "limited system of presences" of modernity's hegemonic discourse formations (Foucault 1972, 119) , denouncing the regressive connotations projected by the notions of man and society, by the threatening actuality of humanism:
Humanism may not be universal but may be quite relative to a certain situation. What we call humanism has been used by the Marxists, liberals, Nazis, Catholics.
[...] What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom. I think that there are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than we can imagine in humanism as it is dogmatically represented on every side of the political rainbow: the Left, the Center, the Right (Foucault 1988, 15) .
This redefinition of Western reason can now be extended beyond the limits envisioned by Foucault, widened into a geophilosophical destruction of transcendentalism and pushed forward into an emancipative topological vitalism. 28 As it turned out, lingering Eurocentrism prevented Foucault from recognizing the local validity and historical contingency of his own critique, the limits of his neo-Kantian dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and necessity. It is our task to interrupt the Kantian sleep and place ourselves in our awake actuality, fulfilling the uncertain promise of The Order of Things, the "emergence of what may perhaps be the space of contemporary thought" (Foucault 1970, 286) .
